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Abstract
This paper argues for a metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quantum
entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding entanglement as a sort of holism.
By contrast to a radical metaphysics of relations, the position set out in this paper recognizes
things that stand in the relations, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there is no
need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties underlying the relations. This
position thus opposes a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic
properties. A principal problem of the latter position is that it seems that we cannot gain any
knowledge of these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. Against this background, the rationale
behind a metaphysics of relations is to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics.
Keywords: entanglement, holism, intrinsic properties, metaphysics, non-separability, relations,
structural realism
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to propose a philosophical characterization of quantum entanglement
within a broader metaphysical framework. The framework is the one of a metaphysics of
relations in contrast to a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic
properties. A metaphysics of relations is a minority view in contemporary philosophy.
According to the mainstream of metaphysical thought, the world consists of independent
individual things that are embedded in space–time. These things are individuals, because (a)
they have a spatio-temporal location, (b) they are a subject of the predication of properties
each and (c) there are some qualitative properties by means of which each of these things is
distinguished from all the other ones (at least the spatio-temporal location is such a property).
Qualitative properties are all and only those properties whose instantiation does not depend
on the existence of any particular individual; properties such as being that individual are
hence excluded. These things are independent, because their basic properties are intrinsic
ones. Basic properties are fundamental in that they are not reducible to other properties, and
they are not disjunctive; that is to say, properties such as “being round or square” are
excluded. Intrinsic are all and only those qualitative properties that a thing has irrespective of
whether or not there are other contingent things; all other qualitative properties are extrinsic
or relational. That is to say: Having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of
accompaniment or loneliness.1
                                                
1 See Langton and Lewis (1998) and for a refinement Lewis (2001).
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A metaphysics of this type can be traced back to Aristotle at least. Aristotle assumes that
there is a plurality of individual things (substances) that are characterized by intrinsic
properties (forms) each.2 A prominent contemporary conception is David Lewis’ thesis of
Humean supervenience:3 at the basic level of the world, there are only local qualities in the
sense of intrinsic properties instantiated by space-time points or point-sized particles or field
sources at space-time points. Space-time points can qualify as individual things in the above-
mentioned sense. Everything there is in a world like ours supervenes on the distribution of
basic intrinsic properties over all space–time points. Whether really everything supervenes on
that distribution is not relevant to the present paper. What is important here is the claim that,
except for spatio-temporal relations, all the relations between the things at the basic level
supervene on their intrinsic properties.
It is well known that quantum physics – notably quantum entanglement – poses a challenge
to Lewis’ Humean supervenience. This paper argues that quantum physics can be taken to
suggest replacing a metaphysics of intrinsic properties with a metaphysics of relations. This
is, of course, a matter of weighing arguments in the interpretation of a physical theory. There
is no direct route of logical implication from physics to a particular metaphysics. A
metaphysics of relations is often dismissed out of hand, for it seems to be paradoxical. It
seems that (a) relations require relata, that is, things which stand in the relations, and that (b)
these things have to be something in themselves, that is, must have intrinsic properties over
and above the relations in which they stand.4 However, a metaphysics of relations merely has
to reject the second part of this claim: one can maintain that (a) relations require relata, that is,
things which stand in the relations, but that (b*) these things do not have any intrinsic
properties that underlie the relations in which they stand. There is nothing paradoxical in this
latter claim. This paper argues for no more than this claim.
By a “thing”, I mean anything that is a subject of the predication of properties, including
relational properties (relations), without being itself predicated as a property of something. I
do not distinguish relations from relational properties: relations are properties as well (albeit
not monadic ones) in that they are predicated of things. Moreover, something can be a thing
without being an individual thing; for something to be an individual thing (an individual),
further conditions may have to be met such as (a) being distinguishable from all the other
things by means of the predication of some qualitative properties or (b) having a primitive
thisness (haecceity).5
A metaphysics of relations can grant that things may have non-qualitative properties over
and above the relational ones such as the property of being this thing, that is, a primitive
thisness; but this position does not have to admit primitive thisness. Accepting that relations
require things which stand in the relations does not commit one to the view that these things
have a primitive thisness. It simply means taking into account that properties, including
relations, are predicated of something; this does not imply that there is more to the related
things than standing in the relations. If one does not endorse primitive thisness, one may say
that a thing is a bundle of properties (or tropes); how a thing can be a bundle of relational
properties (or relational tropes) is no more – and no less – a problem than how it can be a
                                                
2 See in particular Categories, chapter 5, and Metaphysics, book VII.
3 See Lewis (1986a), pp. IX-X.
4 See, for instance, Langton (1998).
5 See Adams (1979).
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bundle of intrinsic properties (or intrinsic tropes). Hence, both the view of things as being
characterized by primitive thisness and the view of things as bundles of properties (or tropes)
are compatible with a metaphysics of relations.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Starting from a conceptualization of quantum
entanglement in terms of non-supervenient relations, the next section argues for conceiving
quantum entanglement as a case of non-separability (that is, a case of holism). It is shown
how this interpretation of quantum entanglement leads to a metaphysics of relations. The third
section then establishes that this is a moderate metaphysics of relations in contrast to a radical
one. Finally, this interpretation of quantum entanglement is put into the broader framework
set out in this introduction: it is argued that this interpretation avoids a gap between
epistemology and metaphysics, whereas a metaphysics of intrinsic properties invites such a
gap.
2. From quantum entanglement to relations without underlying intrinsic properties
2.1 Quantum entanglement
Quantum theory permits that the states of quantum systems are entangled. Instead of speaking
of entangled states, one can also talk directly in terms of entangled systems. However, since
entanglement is state-dependent, it seems more appropriate to use the notion of entangled
states. Entanglement is to say that the quantum systems in question do not have some state-
dependent properties each independently of one another. Examples are position and
momentum as well as spin angular momentum in any direction. Instead, there are only
correlations between the state-dependent properties of the quantum systems in question
encoded in a joint probability distribution determined by the joint state. Quantum theory does
not include any properties of each quantum system taken separately that are a supervenience
basis for these correlated probability distributions. Furthermore, these correlations – and thus
entanglement – are independent of spatio-temporal distance. Because of entanglement,
quantum physics seems to exhibit some sort of a holism.
This way of receiving quantum theory commits us to realism: there are quantum systems,
and they are as quantum theory describes them, namely subject to entanglement. Furthermore,
we are committed to endorsing objective probabilities, that is, probabilities which do not
simply indicate limits of our knowledge, but which are about properties that things
objectively have. Whatever entanglement may exactly be, it is a relation among quantum
systems. “Being entangled with” is a property that is predicated of at least two quantum
systems; it is thus a relational property. By admitting entanglement, we are not committed to
taking a particular stance on the notorious measurement problem in quantum theory: even if
one maintains that measurement leads to a dissolution of entanglement so that, as a result of
measurement, quantum systems really have definite numerical values of the state-dependent
properties in question each, entanglement has to be there in the first place before it makes
sense to consider the question whether or not there are processes that dissolve entanglement.
It is not necessary that the states of quantum systems are entangled. Quantum theory has
the means at its disposal to describe states of physical systems which are not entangled, that
is, product states. However, quantum theory describes physical systems in such a way that
entanglement is not at all exceptional, but ubiquitous. What has to be accounted for in
quantum theory is not entanglement, but cases of the absence of entanglement, if there really
are such cases (if not, it has to be explained why there appear to be such cases).
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Nonetheless, even if the states of quantum systems are entangled, it is possible to give a
description of each of the systems in question considered in isolation from the other systems.
This is a description in terms of what is known as a mixed state in the sense of an improper
mixture:6 this description contains all the information that can be acquired about each of the
quantum systems considered on its own. But it ignores the correlations in which the
entanglement consists. Consequently, this description does not take all the factors into
account that are relevant to the quantum probabilities. The description in terms of improper
mixtures therefore is an incomplete description of quantum systems in entangled states. It is
not a description that refers to intrinsic properties of each quantum system.
2.2 Non-supervenient relations
A prominent philosophical proposal for a characterization of quantum entanglement is the one
of Paul Teller (1986). He describes quantum entanglement in terms of relational holism,
taking it to consist in non-supervenient relations:
Holism has always seemed incoherent, for it seems to say that two distinct things can somehow
be entangled or intermeshed so that they are not two distinct things after all. … By relational
holism I will mean the claim that objects which in at least some circumstances we can identify as
separate individuals have inherent relations , that is, relations which do not supervene on the
non-relational properties of the distinct individuals. Relational holism is free of the incoherence
which threatens less clearly stated forms of holism. It is sufficient for an object to be a distinct
individual that it have a non-relational property. And it is quite consistent to suppose that two
such distinct individuals, each having a non-relational property, should also stand in some
inherent relation to each other. (p. 73)
Teller thus regards quantum systems as distinct individuals. He claims that what is peculiar
about these individuals is that they bear some non-supervenient relations to each other.
Hence, according to Teller, it is necessary that quantum systems have some intrinsic
properties or other, which make them distinct individuals, in order to be able to stand in the
relations of quantum entanglement, even if these relations do not supervene on the intrinsic
properties. He suggests that if the presupposition of intrinsic properties that make quantum
systems distinct individuals were abandoned, the claim of holism in quantum physics would
be an incoherent position.
Consider furthermore what David Mermin (1998) proposes as the Ithaca interpretation of
quantum mechanics, namely that quantum theory describes a world of correlations without
describing intrinsic properties of the correlata.7 Mermin goes on to say that “the correlata
that underlie those correlations lie beyond the descriptive powers of physical science” (p.
762) and that “in our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of
the phenomena” (p. 764). Again, the idea is that quantum theory describes relations and that
these relations presuppose intrinsic properties of the related systems, which are beyond the
scope of quantum theory.
However, the characterization as a non-supervenient relation is not sufficient to capture
quantum entanglement. Spatio-temporal relations, for instance, are non-supervenient, too.
Independently of quantum theory, Carol Cleland (1984) introduces a distinction between
weakly and strongly non-supervenient relations. She employs the familiar philosophical
                                                
6 See d’Espagnat (1971), chapter 6.3.
7 See also Rovelli (1996).
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differentiation between a determinable attribute – such as having mass – and a determinate
attribute – such as having a mass of 6g: nothing has mass simpliciter, but only in a
determinate way. She formalizes the concept of a supervenient relation by setting out two
conditions:
A dyadic relation R is supervenient upon a determinable nonrelational attribute P if and only if
1.! (" x, y) ~ ◊ [R (x, y) and there are no determinate attributes Pi and Pj of
determinable kind P such that Pi (x) and Pj (y)];
2.! (" x, y) {R (x, y) … there are determinate attributes Pi and Pj of determinable kind P
such that Pi (x) and Pj (y) and ! (" x, y) [(Pi (x) and Pj (y)) … R (x, y)]}. (p. 25)
The first condition states: it is necessary for a supervenient relation that each of the related
things instantiates a determinate non-relational – that is, intrinsic – property of a certain
determinable kind. The second condition adds that these instantiations of intrinsic properties
determine the relation in question. It is necessary that any two things which instantiate the
same intrinsic properties stand in the same relation to each other. Cleland gives the example
of mass relations. An individual that has a mass of 8g is heavier than an individual that has a
mass of 6g. Any two individuals that have the same masses respectively instantiate the same
mass relation. Therefore, mass relations are supervenient on the property of mass, which can
be considered as intrinsic for the purpose of the argument (pp. 23-27).
Coming to non-supervenience, a relation is weakly non-supervenient if and only if it
satisfies the first, but not the second of these conditions. That is to say: it is necessary that all
the related things instantiate intrinsic properties of a certain kind. But these intrinsic
properties are not sufficient to determine the relation in question. Cleland gives the following
example: according to her, if two individuals are to bear a relation of spatial distance to each
other, each of them must have a size or shape. However, their size or shape does not
determine the spatial distance between them. Therefore, Cleland claims that the relation of
spatial distance is weakly non-supervenient: this relation satisfies the first condition for a
supervenient relation, but it fails to conform to the second one (pp. 27-28).
Accordingly, a relation is strongly non-supervenient if and only if it does not satisfy the
first condition for a supervenient relation either (pp. 28-29). It is thus not necessary that two
things have intrinsic properties of a certain kind, if they bear a strongly non-supervenient
relation to each other. Strongly non-supervenient relations permit that the related things have
intrinsic properties each, but they do not require intrinsic properties of a certain kind. Steven
French convincingly argues that the non-supervenient relations in the case of quantum
entanglement are strongly non-supervenient in Cleland’s sense.8 Quantum entanglement is
not tied to the related systems having intrinsic properties of a certain kind.
Cleland’s distinction between weakly and strongly non-supervenient relations may be
helpful to differentiate quantum entanglement from spatio-temporal relations. According to
Cleland, spatial relations are weakly non-supervenient. The relations of quantum
entanglement, by contrast, are strongly non-supervenient. However, this distinction is not
sufficient to conceptualize quantum entanglement.
In On the plurality of worlds, David Lewis (1986b) considers whether there can be external
relations which are not strictly or analogically spatio-temporal and which unify a world. He
imagines the following test case:
                                                
8 French (1989), pp. 8–18, in particular pp. 17-18.
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We tend to think that positive and negative charge are natural intrinsic properties of particles;
but suppose not. Suppose instead there are natural external relations of like-chargedness and
opposite-chargedness. … On this view, as opposed to the standard view, the relations of like-
and opposite-chargedness do not supervene on the intrinsic natures of two particles taken
separately; an electron and a positron may be perfect intrinsic duplicates. That is the point of
calling the relations external. They are natural ex hypothesi. They are pervasive (at least, given
the appropriate laws) in that whenever two particles are connected by a chain of such relations,
they are connected directly. But they are very far from discriminating (again, given the
appropriate laws): if there are as few as three particles, there must be two of them that are alike
as far as these relations are concerned. If this story, or something like it, could be true, then here
we have external relations that are not strictly or analogically spatio-temporal. (p. 77)
Lewis’ imaginary charge relations are strongly non-supervenient in Cleland’s sense: standing
in these relations is not tied to instantiating intrinsic properties of a certain kind. Lewis argues
that these imaginary charge relations are unable to unify a world, because there is no
convincing reason against considering two things in different possible worlds as also standing
in relations of like- or opposite-chargedness to each other (pp. 76-78). In the case of the
quantum relations of entanglement, by contrast, there is, like in the case of spatio-temporal
relations, no question of these relations holding also among things across different worlds.
However, spatio-temporal relations as well as Lewis’ imaginary charge relations are state-
independent in the following sense: any two things in a world bear some spatio-temporal
relation to each other whatever their state is. By contrast, it is state-dependent whether two
things bear a relation of entanglement to each other. Nonetheless, since entanglement is
ubiquitous at the microphysical level in all the worlds to which quantum theory applies, we
can say: not only spatio-temporal relations, but also quantum relations of entanglement unify
our world. Both are non-supervenient relations that connect only things in one world.
Lewis’ imaginary charge relations come closer to quantum entanglement than spatio-
temporal relations in the following respect: in the case of these charge relations as well as in
the quantum case we expect the relations to be determined by properties which each of the
related systems has independently of the other systems. In other words, we have a prior
understanding of properties such as charge as well as position and momentum as being
intrinsic properties. But it then turns out that these properties are not intrinsic and that there
are no intrinsic properties which accomplish such a determination. Nonetheless, there is
nothing like entanglement in Lewis’ example. Lewis simply invites us to imagine a case in
which the properties of being like-charged or being opposite-charged with respect to certain
other things are irreducibly relational. Hence, Lewis’ imaginary charge relations show the
following: even if we make an exception for spatio-temporal relations, speaking of non-
supervenient relations is not sufficient to capture what is peculiar about quantum
entanglement.
2.3 Non-separability
The sense in which there is a failure of supervenience in quantum entanglement can be
elaborated on in another way than simply speaking of non-supervenient relations. In any case
of quantum entanglement, there are no states of the parts on which the joint state of the whole
of the systems in question supervenes. We can make this notion of a failure of supervenience
more restrictive by employing the concept of separability.
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Albert Einstein based his criticism of quantum theory on the principle of separability,
which he regarded as some sort of a presupposition without which physical science would not
be possible at all.9 Taking Einstein’s criticism into account, Don Howard formulates
separability as the claim that (1) spatially separated systems possess their own, distinct
physical state each and that (2) the joint state of two or more spatially separated systems is
wholly determined by their separate states.10 In view of employing the notion of separability
for a systematic characterization of quantum entanglement, it seems reasonable to eliminate
the condition of the systems being spatially separated; for entanglement is independent of
whether or not the systems whose states are entangled are spatially separated. For instance,
the spin state of the two electrons of a helium atom in the groundstate is a case of
entanglement, too (singlet state), although the two electrons are not localized in such a way
that they are spatially separated from one another. Furthermore, in quantum computation, one
considers the entanglement of the states of many systems which are usually not localized in
such a way that they are separated in space. Abandoning the condition of spatial separation,
one can characterize separability in this way: Physical systems have a state each in the sense
that (1) this state completely determines the state-dependent properties of the system and (2)
the joint state of two or more systems supervenes on the states which each of these systems
has. On this basis, let us characterize non-separability in the following way:
Non-separability
The states of two or more systems are non-separable if and only if it is only the joint
state of the whole that completely determines the state-dependent properties of each
system and the correlations among these systems (to the extent that these are determined
at all).
According to this characterization, any case of quantum entanglement is a case of non-
separability, and non-separability is the reason why quantum entanglement is a sort of
holism.11 In any case of quantum entanglement, only the joint state of the whole completely
determines the probability distributions of the state-dependent properties of the parts by
determining correlations among these probability distributions.
Coming back to Lewis’s example of imaginary charge relations mentioned in the previous
section, this is simply the case of one system being in a state of, say, opposite-chargedness
relative to another system (or other systems). This is comparable to the case when, as a result
of measurement and a dissolution of entanglement, there is, in the paradigmatic example of
the singlet spin state of a pair of systems of spin 1/2, the one system in a state of opposite spin
relative to the other system. However, when the spin states of the two systems are entangled,
it is not the case that each system is in a spin state opposite to the other system.
Consider another example: Max Black conceives a possible world in which there are only
two spheres that have the same non-relational properties.12 There is a definite distance
between these two spheres. But neither sphere has a position in distinction from the other
sphere (unless one presupposes absolute space). In Black’s example, each sphere is in a state
of (or has the property of) being at a distance of, say, ten metres from another sphere. In the
                                                
9 See in particular Einstein (1948), pp. 321-322, translated in Howard (1985), pp. 187-188.
10 Howard (1989), pp. 225-227.
11 For an elaboration on the link between non-separability and holism, see Esfeld (2001), chapter 8.
12 Black (1952), p. 156.
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example of the states of two quantum systems entangled with respect to position and
momentum that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) consider in their famous paper, by
contrast, even if the global observable of relative distance has the definite numerical value of,
say, ten metres, it is not permissible to attribute to each of the two systems the state – and
thereby the property – of being at a distance of ten metres from the other system. Imagine a
simplified experimental realization of this case. If we attributed to the one system the property
of being ten metres apart from the other system and attributed to that other system the
property of being ten metres apart from the first system, we would imply that one system is
on the one side of the experimental arrangement and the other system on the other side.
However, we can ask about the local observable of position of each of the two systems, and
we get a probability distribution which is identical for the two systems and which extends to
both sides of the experimental arrangement. Hence, in the case of Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen, there is no warrant in the formalism of quantum theory for assuming that the one
system is on one side of the arrangement and the other system on the other side of the
arrangement.13 The cases of quantum entanglement are cases of non-separability in that there
is only a joint state determining certain correlations that obtain among the systems in question
without it being possible to attribute significant states (or state-dependent properties for that
matter) to each of the systems in question, and be it relative to the other systems.
Nonetheless, characterizing what quantum theory tells us in terms of non-separability is a
metaphysical proposal that is a matter of philosophical argument. As with any philosophical
argument, the experimental evidence – in particular, the analysis of Bell’s theorem and the
evidence coming from the Bell experiments – does not force a commitment to non-
separability upon us.14 My claim is that speaking of non-separability provides us with a
convincing understanding of what is going on in quantum entanglement.
One can conceive the joint state of a quantum whole as including intrinsic properties of the
whole, that is, intrinsic properties which do not supervene on intrinsic properties of the
parts.15 These intrinsic properties of the whole, however, do not speak in favour of a
metaphysics of intrinsic properties in contrast to a metaphysics of relations: Any relation
between two or more systems can be conceived as an intrinsic property of the whole of the
systems in question. In quantum entanglement, the intrinsic properties of the whole are global
observables such as, in the case of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, relative distance and total
momentum as well as total spin in the case of the singlet spin state of a pair of systems of spin
1/2. These global observables are represented as a certain combination of local observables of
the parts in the Hilbert space formalism. They thus contain information about the way in
which the parts are related to each other. Moreover, since quantum entanglement is
ubiquitous, strictly speaking, only the whole of all quantum systems taken together can be
considered as being in a pure state. Intrinsic properties of the world as a whole at the quantum
level, however, do not in any way challenge a metaphysics of relations. No argument for a
metaphysics of intrinsic properties can be built on such intrinsic properties.
For any system of a certain kind, there is a family of properties that make something a
system of the kind in question. State-dependent properties such as position, momentum, and
                                                
13 See also the argument in Cartwright (1989), p. 263.
14 For a view against non-separability see the recent paper by Winsberg and Fine (2003). See, however,
Müller and Placek (2001) for an argument against Fine’s approach.
15 Compare Healey (1991).
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spin in any direction belong to the family of properties that make something a quantum
system. Nothing can count as a quantum physical system without having these properties in
some sense. If one countenances essential properties, position, momentum, and spin in any
direction count among the essential properties of a quantum physical system. In the case of
quantum entanglement, however, quantum systems do not have these properties separately.
Nonetheless, these systems taken together have properties of the kind position, momentum, or
spin – such as, in the paradigmatic examples mentioned above, relative distance and total
momentum as well as total spin.
If asked about position, momentum, or spin in a given direction of one of the two systems
in the state that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen consider or in the singlet state, one can
therefore say the following: one system is related with another system in such a way that only
the two systems taken together have properties of the kind in question – in the sense of a
relative distance with a definite numerical value, total momentum zero, or total spin zero.
Nonetheless, the property of relative distance of the whole indicates the way in which the
parts are related with respect to position (although it is not the case that each of the parts has a
position); for the global observable of relative distance contains the correlations between the
probability distributions of the local observables in question, in whatever way one may
interpret these correlated probability distributions. The property of total momentum of the
whole indicates the way in which the parts are related with respect to momentum, although it
is not the case that each of the parts has a momentum – and be it one that is simply opposed to
the momentum of the other system. Accordingly, the property of total spin of the whole
indicates the way in which the parts are related with respect to spin in any direction, although
it is not the case that each of the parts has a spin in any direction – and be it one that is simply
opposed to the spin of the other system.
A similar consideration applies to any case of entanglement: there are global observables of
the whole that have a definite numerical value in the state in question and that can be
considered as intrinsic properties of the whole. These properties of the whole indicate the way
in which the parts are related with respect to their state-dependent properties, for they contain
correlations between the probability distributions of the respective state-dependent properties
of the parts, although these state-dependent properties cannot be attributed to each of the
parts.
We can thus set out an account of quantum entanglement in this way:
1) Quantum entanglement shows that there are non-supervenient relations among physical
systems over and above the spatio-temporal relations (strongly non-supervenient relations
in contrast to weakly non-supervenient relations).
2) The non-supervenient relations of entanglement among the parts of a quantum whole
amount to the whole having intrinsic properties that do not supervene on intrinsic
properties of the parts.
3) These properties of the whole come to non-separability in the following sense: the parts
have some of the properties that belong to the family of properties which make something
a quantum system not separately, but only in this way: there are properties of the whole
which indicate the manner in which the parts are related with each other with respect to
some of the properties that make something a quantum system.
If we spell out the non-supervenient relations in the quantum case in terms of non-separability
and thus holism as proposed here, quantum theory is no longer neutral with respect to the
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issue of a metaphysics of intrinsic properties vs. a metaphysics of relations. Quantum theory,
interpreted in terms of non-separability, speaks in favour of a metaphysics of relations that do
not require any intrinsic properties of the related quantum systems. As far as the properties
that are subject to entanglement are concerned, there is no reason to suppose that there are
intrinsic properties of the related systems in question: the relations among the systems are
determined from above so to speak, namely by the pure state of the whole. This way of
determining the relations makes it superfluous to call for intrinsic properties of the related
systems, even if there is no question of intrinsic properties constituting a supervenience basis
for the relations. All we need for these relations to obtain is systems in the sense of entities of
which properties can be predicated, and be it relational properties such as “being entangled
with”. There is no need for the systems of which such properties can be predicated to be
distinct individuals.
Quantum systems have more properties than the state-dependent ones, which are subject to
entanglement, namely state-independent properties such as mass or charge. One may wonder
whether these are intrinsic properties. However that may be, bringing state-independent
properties into focus can at most show that quantum systems may have intrinsic properties
that are not relevant to the correlations that quantum theory describes. Thus, referring to state-
independent properties can at most illustrate the following point: if one puts forward an
argument for a metaphysics of relations on the basis of a physical theory, one cannot exclude
that the physical systems in question have some intrinsic property or other. What one can seek
to establish is only that the relations which the physical theory in question treats do not call
for any intrinsic properties of the related systems. Nonetheless, since quantum theory is our
basic physical theory, it would be desirable to derive state-independent properties within the
formalism of quantum theory. The idea then is to get to state-independent properties such as
charge and mass on the basis of state-dependent properties.
Non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be taken to describe single physical systems such
as electrons, neutrons, protons and the like. These are single physical systems, because, as far
as quantum mechanics is concerned, there always is a definite number of them. They are
subjects of the predication of properties each – and be it properties such as “is entangled with
other systems”. Quantum systems of the same kind whose states are entangled are
indistinguishable. There are no qualitative properties whatsoever – not even relational
conditional probabilities – that distinguish one such system from all the other ones.
Nonetheless, one can maintain that quantum systems are individuals if one is prepared to
acknowledge non-qualitative properties such as primitive thisness.16 The proposal made in
this section is compatible with such a view. But the point is that it does not commit us to more
than acknowledging that, as far as quantum physics is concerned, quantum systems are those
things that stand in the correlations without any intrinsic properties or anything like a
primitive thisness being required for standing in the correlations. Hence, both the friends of
non-individuals and the friends of individuals can agree with the metaphysics of relations
proposed in this section. It is important to disentangle the issue of quantum entanglement
from the issue of individuals: entanglement rules out that there are individuals that are
distinguished by some qualitative properties, but it does not exclude that there may be
individuals tout court.
                                                
16 See French and Redhead (1988).
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3. A moderate vs. a radical metaphysics of relations
The position argued for in the preceding section comes close to what Steven French and
James Ladyman advocate as metaphysical or ontic structural realism, namely the view that
structure is what is real and that there are no intrinsic properties underlying structure.17 Their
argument for this position makes also use of quantum entanglement. Ladyman (1998)
concludes by envisaging that “structural realism amounts to the claim that theories tell us not
about the objects and properties of which the world is made, but directly about structure and
relations” (p. 422), suggesting that there is no need to admit objects in metaphysics. The
structural realism of French and Ladyman thus seems to be a radical metaphysics of
relations.18 It rejects not only the claim that (1) things have to be something in themselves,
that is, must have intrinsic properties over and above the relations in which they stand, but
also the claim that (2) relations require relata, that is, things which stand in the relations. The
metaphysics of relations advocated in the preceding section, by contrast, dismisses only the
first claim. It therefore is a moderate metaphysics of relations. The argument of this paper
accepts that relations require things that stand in the relations (although these things do not
have to be individuals, and they need not have intrinsic properties) and regards physical
theories as referring to things. In particular, the argument of the preceding section says
nothing against quantum theory referring to quantum systems and describing the properties of
these systems, albeit – somewhat peculiar – relational properties. In other words, an argument
that builds on quantum entanglement seems to be sufficient only to renounce (1), but does not
touch upon (2). At least as far as quantum mechanics is concerned, there are quantum systems
that stand in the relations, even if it can be maintained that they fall short of being individuals.
(Quantum field theory would in any case require a separate treatment).
French and Ladyman base their ontic structural realism on structural realism as set out by
John Worrall (1989). Worrall’s structural realism is motivated by two considerations: to take
up the ‘no miracle argument’ for scientific realism, that is the argument that the predictive
success of our physical theories would be a miracle if they were not tracking truth; and to pay
heed to the ‘argument from pessimistic induction’, that is the claim that since most of our past
physical theories have turned out to be false, it is likely that our present physical theories will
endure the same fate. According to Worrall, what is preserved in theory change is structure.
Consequently, we should be realists with respect to the structure of our physical theories. This
argument for scientific realism hangs upon the structure of a physical theory being
distinguished as that what is preserved in theory change from something that is not preserved.
In Worrall, the contrast is between structure and nature. He writes, “the structural realist …
insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever ‘understand’ the nature of the basic
furniture of the universe” (p. 122). This is the old distinction again between structure or
relations that can be known and intrinsic properties of the related things that cannot be known
(cf. Mermin’s Ithaca interpretation of quantum theory mentioned in section 2.2 above).
French and Ladyman advance their ontic structural realism in order to overcome that
distinction. Their motivation, as well as the motivation of this paper, is to avoid being
committed to intrinsic properties of which we cannot gain any knowledge insofar as their
intrinsic nature is concerned. Nonetheless, in this context, the point of this paper is that in
                                                
17 See Ladyman (1998), French and Ladyman (2003).
18 For another contemporary version of a radical metaphysics of relations see Dipert (1997).
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order to get this result, we do not have to jettison the admission of relata, that is, things which
stand in the relations.
By way of consequence, however, if we give up Worrall’s distinction between structure and
nature, the argument for a metaphysics of relations can as such not say anything in defence of
scientific realism against the challenge posed by the ‘argument from pessimistic induction’ –
apart from making clear that there is no reason to abandon scientific realism as a result of the
advent of quantum theory. If quantum theory is superseded by another fundamental physical
theory, it may be that the claim that our basic physical theory speaks against intrinsic
properties underlying the relations is no longer defensible, because an argument such as the
sketched one from quantum entanglement to non-separability would then no longer be
available. Any metaphysics that builds on science runs such a risk.
4. Avoiding a gap between epistemology and metaphysics
Let us come back to the broader metaphysical framework of a metaphysics of relations vs. a
metaphysics of intrinsic properties. Let us assume, in contrast to what has been argued for so
far in this paper, that the world at the basic level consists of independent things. How do we
gain knowledge of their intrinsic properties? Consider the following problem that Frank
Jackson (1998) among others raises:
When physicists tell us about the properties they take to be fundamental, they tell us what these
properties do. This is no accident. We know about what things are like essentially through the
way they impinge on us and our measuring instruments. It does not follow from this that the
fundamental properties of current physics, or of ‘completed’ physics, are causal cum relational
ones. It may be that our terms for the fundamental properties pick out the properties they do via
the causal relations the properties enter into, but that at least some of the properties so picked out
are intrinsic. They have, as we might put it, relational names but intrinsic essences. However, it
does suggest the possibility that (i) there are two quite different intrinsic properties, P and P*,
which are exactly alike in the causal relations they enter into, (ii) sometimes one is possessed
and sometimes the other, and (iii) we mistakenly think that there is just one property because the
difference does not make a difference (as the point is put in information theory). An obvious
extension of this possibility leads to the uncomfortable idea that we may know next to nothing
about the intrinsic nature of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature. (pp. 23-
24)
The core of this argument can be reconstructed as follows: (1) We gain empirical knowledge
owing to the causal relations that obtain between physical things and our senses. (2)
Knowledge thus gained may refer to intrinsic properties of physical things. (3) But the way in
which that knowledge is caused imposes a constraint on its content: physical properties can be
identified only through the relations in which they enter. If we explain the meaning of the
propositions that refer to the fundamental physical properties, it turns out that these
propositions describe these properties as relational. (4) Identity of relations, however, does
not imply identity of intrinsic properties. (5) We therefore do not know the properties of
physical things insofar as they are intrinsic. In other words, we are ignorant of the intrinsic
natures of things.
The argument is not that since we gain knowledge through the way in which empirical
things impinge on our senses, we know only the way in which they are related to us. The
argument is one about the content of empirical predicates, namely that they reveal only
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relations among things. The argument applies to all relations; the relations in which things
stand to us do not have any special status as far as the content of empirical knowledge is
concerned. To illustrate the claim, one might say that charge, for instance, is the property that
makes things attract and repulse one another, mass the property that makes them resist
acceleration, etc.
The argument hence contains two claims: a claim about the causes of empirical knowledge
and a claim about its content. The causal claim is uncontroversial; the claim about content is
more controversial. Let us nonetheless assume that the argument of Jackson (and others), if
reconstructed and generalized in the way just sketched, is right as far as the basic level of the
world is concerned. If it is true that our basic physical theories give us knowledge only of the
relations in which physical things stand, the metaphysics of intrinsic properties is in trouble:
metaphysics has it that there are, at the basic level of the world, independent things, which are
characterized by intrinsic properties each. On epistemological reflection, however, we have to
concede that we do not have access to these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. A gap
between metaphysics and epistemology thus arises.
If physics tells us only about the way in which the things at the basic level of the world are
related to each other, two different metaphysical positions remain open:
1) One can continue to hold on to a metaphysics of intrinsic properties of the systems at the
basic level of the world, but concede that we cannot gain any knowledge of these
properties insofar as they are intrinsic.
2) One can give up a metaphysics of intrinsic properties in favour of a metaphysics of
relations according to which the relations in which they stand are all there is to the things
at the basic level.
The first one is the position that Jackson – somewhat reluctantly – endorses. As already
mentioned in the introduction, the main argument for this position is that (a) relations require
relata, that is, things which stand in the relations, and that (b) these things have to be
something in themselves, that is, must have intrinsic properties over and above the relations in
which they stand. Jackson makes use of this argument when he dismisses the view “that the
nature of everything is relational cum causal, which makes a mystery of what it is that stands
in the causal relations” (p. 24). However, as has been made clear in this paper, a metaphysics
of relations has to reject merely the second part of this argument: one can maintain that (a)
relations require relata, that is, things which stand in the relations, but that (b*) these things
do not have any intrinsic properties over and above the relational properties, which can in
principle be captured by physics. In this case, there is nothing paradoxical about a
metaphysics of relations. In other words, there is no a priori argument that excludes a –
moderate – metaphysics of relations.
On the other hand, the adherent to a metaphysics of relations does not have any means at
her disposal to rule out that there are some intrinsic properties or other of the related things.
On an a priori basis, her claim can only be that, since her position is coherent, there is no
argument left for maintaining that related things must of metaphysical necessity have some
intrinsic property or other. Her a priori argument can only be that, applying Occam’s razor, it
is superfluous to include unknowable intrinsic properties in our account of the basic level of
the world. However, in order to make a positive case for a metaphysics of relations, mere
coherence is not enough. It is here that the metaphysical importance of the philosophy of
quantum physics shows up: if we interpret quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability
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as sketched in this paper, we are entitled to maintain that the specific relations which our
basic physical theory treats do not call for intrinsic properties of the related systems being
admitted in our metaphysics, even if we cannot know these properties insofar as they are
intrinsic. Thus, contrary to received opinion, quantum physics, in virtue of exhibiting
entanglement, just provides us with the means to avoid a gap between epistemology and
metaphysics: we can in principle know all there is at the basic level of the world; for what
there is at the basic level of the world are relations of quantum entanglement.
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